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Abstract 
This research examines the role of narcissistic versus genuine self-evaluation in the 
retrieval of self-threatening memories. Autobiographical memories can be retrieved either 
from a first-person or a third-person visual perspective. Because narcissism is linked to 
sensitivity to psychological threats, it should predict retrieval of self-threatening memories 
using the third-person perspective. Genuine self-esteem, on the other hand, is resilient to 
threats. Therefore, it should be associated with retrieving self-relevant, even if threatening, 
memories from the first-person perspective. In two experiments we measured narcissism and 
self-esteem. Experiment 1 manipulated valence of self-relevant memories by asking 
participants to recall self-threatening (shameful) or self-boosting (proud) situations. 
Experiment 2 manipulated self-relevance of negative memories by asking participants to 
recall self-threatening (shameful) or negative, yet not self-threatening (sad) situations. Visual 
perspective of memory retrieval served as the dependent variable. In Experiment 1, 
narcissism predicted avoiding the first-person perspective and employing the third-person 
perspective in self-threatening memories. Genuine self-esteem predicted employing the first-
person perspective, regardless of the memories being self-threatening or self-boosting. In 
Experiment 2, narcissism predicted the third-person perspective, while genuine self-esteem 
predicted the first-person perspective when self-threatening memories were recalled. Neither 
narcissism, nor genuine self-esteem were associated with visual perspective when 
participants recalled negative memories irrelevant to the self. Results shed light on the role of 
self-evaluation in processing autobiographical memories.    
 
Keywords: visual perspective, autobiographical memory, narcissism, self-esteem, emotion 
regulation 
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One remarkable feature of the human mind is a capability to travel back in time 
through RQH¶Vlife history. This process refers to autobiographical memory²a system 
consisting of semantic knowledge and personal experiences happening at specific places and 
times (Williams, Conway, & Cohen, 2008). Researchers have identified two major 
approaches of retrieving autobiographical memories: first-person and third-person visual 
perspectives (Nigro & Neisser, 1983). In the first-person perspective we picture situations 
³ZLWKRXURZQH\HV´IURPWKHVDPHYLHZSRLQWH[SHULHQFHGDWHQFRGLQJ,QWKHWKLUG-person 
perspective we can see ourselves in the memory, as if we were an observer visualizing past 
actions from an external vantage point. 
Autobiographical memories which are in some way threatening are often retrieved 
from the third-person visual perspective (McIsaac & Eich, 2004). A frequently encountered 
explanation is that the third-person perspective serves as a distancing function that helps 
dampen the emotional impact of threatening events (Ayduk & Kross, 2010) or detach the past 
self from the present self (Sutin & Robins, 2008). The first-person visual perspective, on the 
other hand, has been presented as a mechanism of emotional amplification, automatically 
connecting the pictured event to the present self (Sutin & Robins, 2008). Thus, naturally 
evoked third-person perspective might serve as a response to psychological threat, especially 
when individuals have limited resources to deal with the threat otherwise. If this is the case, 
then the use of the third-person perspective should be related to one of the basic 
psychological determinants of responses to threats: self-evaluation. 
In a study by Ross and Wilson (2002) participants with high (vs. low) self-esteem 
reported feeling greater distance from threatening experiences. Yet, Libby, Valenti, Pfent, & 
Eibach (2011; Study 1) found no significant association between self-esteem and the natural 
occurrence of visual perspective when recalling self-threatening memories. These authors, 
however, did not distinguish between self-evaluation that is narcissistic versus genuine. The 
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present studies take a closer look at the role of the two types of self-evaluation in retrieving 
self-threatening autobiographical memories. 
Narcissism is an inflated self-evaluation associated with the need for external 
validation (Raskin & Terry, 1988). Narcissists are hypersensitive to criticism and defensive in 
response to ego threats (Horvath & Morf, 2009). Thus, we expect that when retrieving self-
threatening memories narcissists would show a defensive need to avoid the first-person point 
of view and employ the third-person perspective. In contrast, genuine self-esteem without the 
narcissistic component is a well-anchored self-evaluation that can serve as a buffer against 
psychological threats (Paulhus, Robins, Trzesniewski, & Tracy, 2004). Thus, retrieving self-
threatening memories among individuals with high genuine self-esteem might be associated 
with confronting negative emotions via the first-person perspective.  
 Narcissism and genuine self-esteem are both favorable forms of self-evaluation and 
are positively correlated. Following past research (Cichocka, Marchlewska, & Golec de 
Zavala, 2016; Paulhus et al., 2004), to distinguish their unique effects, we accounted for their 
shared variance. In this way, we were able to observe the effects of narcissism, minus its 
overlap with self-esteem, and vice-versa. 
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 manipulated memory content by asking participants to recall events that 
were either self-threatening (i.e., shameful) or self-boosting (i.e., proud). Pride and shame 
differ in valence but are both relevant to the self (Tracy & Robins, 2004). We hypothesized 
that narcissism would predict adopting the third-person perspective when recalling self-
threatening memories but the first-person perspective when recalling self-boosting memories. 
Genuine self-esteem, however, should predict adopting the first-person perspective regardless 
of the memory being self-boosting or self-threatening. 
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Method 
Experiment 1 was conducted among 100 students (51 female), aged 18-35 years 
(M=22.63, SD=3.20) recruited in a university library. Sample size was predetermined as 50 
participants per experimental condition (Simonsohn, Nelson, & Simmons, 2013). 
Self-esteem and narcissism were measured first (counterbalanced)1. We used 
5RVHQEHUJ¶V6HOI-Esteem Scale (Polish adaptation; Dzwonkowska, Lachowicz-
7DEDF]HN	àDJXQD, with responses from 1=completely disagree to 5=definitely 
agree (Į=.88, M=3.69, SD=0.77), and the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (Raskin & Hall, 
1979; 34-item Polish adaptation, BD]LĔVND	'UDW-Ruszczak, 2000), where participants rated 
statements representing narcissistic traits on a scale from 1=Not at all like me to 5=Very much 
like me (Į=.91, M=3.10, SD=0.62).  
Then, participants were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions and 
were asked to describe memories associated with either self-threatening (shameful) or self-
boosting (proud) social situation (Ross & Wilson, 2002; Study 3), that happened over the last 
year. Effectiveness of the manipulation was checked with one item measuring whether 
participants felt proud or ashamed while recalling the situation (1= ashamed to 11= proud). 
Four participants who failed to describe a memory or respond to the manipulation check were 
excluded (final n=96; 46 in the self-threat condition, 50 in the self-boost condition).  
Finally, visual perspective was measured with one item: ³When recalling the 
described event, did you see the event through your own eyes (first-person perspective) or as 
                                                          
1
 In both experiments results remained similar when we did not exclude any participants. 
Presentation order did not moderate the effects. 
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an outside observer (third-person perspective)"´ on a scale from -3=own eyes (first-person) 
perspective to +3=outside observer (third-person) perspective (Rice & Rubin, 2009; Study 
1), recoded into a 1-7 scale with higher scores indicating stronger third-person perspective 
(M=3.15, SD=2.24)2.  
Results and discussion 
Self-esteem and narcissism were positively correlated, r(94)=.43, p<.001. Third-
person perspective was positively correlated with narcissism, r(94)=.21, p=.046, but not with 
self-esteem, r(94)=-.07, p=.48. 
A check on the effectiveness of the manipulation revealed that participants in the self-
boost condition felt more proud (M=8.86, SD=1.74) than participants in the self-threat 
condition (M=3.61, SD=1.93), t(94)=14.04, p<.001, d=2.86. 
We performed a hierarchical multiple regression analysis to investigate the effects of 
recalling self-relevant threatening versus boosting memories on visual perspective in 
interaction with self-esteem and narcissism. Continuous variables were mean-centered. 
Experimental conditions were coded -1=self-boost and 1=self-threat. In Step 1, we 
investigated the main effects of the experimental condition, self-esteem and their interaction 
on visual perspective. In Step 2 we introduced narcissism and the two-way interaction of the 
experimental condition with narcissism (Table 1).  
Table 1 
Experiment 1 Predictors of Third-Person Visual Perspective 
                                                          
2
 For both Experiments we report all measures, manipulations, and exclusions (see 
Supplement for remaining measures and analyses).  
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 Step 1 Step 2 
Variables B(SE) BCI95% p B(SE) BCI95% p 
Condition -0.35(0.23) -0.81,0.10 .13 -0.34(0.21) -0.76,0.09 .12 
Self-esteem -0.21(0.30) -0.80,0.39 .49 -0.64(0.31) -1.26,-0.03 .04 
&RQGLWLRQî6HOI-esteem 0.12(0.30) -0.47,0.72 .68 -0.24(0.31) -0.85,0.38 .45 
Narcissism    1.33(0.40) 0.54,2.13 .001 
&RQGLWLRQî1DUFLVVLVP    1.11(0.40) 0.32,1.91 .01 
F 1.01 .39 3.69 .004 
R2 0.03 0.17 
 
Only once we co-varied out narcissism, did genuine self-esteem predict the first-
person perspective, regardless of the self-relevant memory being boosting or threatening. 
Narcissism predicted the third-person perspective, but this effect was moderated by the 
experimental condition. Narcissism significantly predicted the third-person perspective in the 
self-threat condition, but not in the self-boost condition (see Figure 1 for simple slopes). We 
also analyzed the effects of the experimental condition for different levels of narcissism using 
PROCESS (Hayes & Matthes, 2009; Johnson & Neyman, 1936). The self-threat condition 
significantly negatively predicted the third-person perspective for narcissism lower than 3.02. 
For higher values the relationship was not significant, but it became significantly positive for 
values higher than 4.43.  
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Narcissism predicted avoiding the first-person perspective and adopting the third-
person perspective when recalling self-threatening memories of shame. Narcissism also 
positively predicted the third-person perspective in proud memories, although this effect was 
not significant. This finding might reflect the fact that narcissists use the external perspective 
generally more often than non-narcissists (Robins & John, 1997), which could have 
counteracted the inclination to see proud memories from the first-person perspective. 
External perspective gives narcissists not only an opportunity to distort information about 
themselves when facing threats (reflecting self-protection motives), but also to ensure 
positive situations are seen favorably (reflecting self-enhancement motives; Robins & John, 
1997).  
Experiment 2 
 Experiment 2 examined whether the results of Experiment 1 are specific to self-
relevant memories. Therefore, we focused on a different set of emotions: sadness and shame. 
These emotions do not differ in valence but shame is a self-relevant emotion and sadness is 
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not (Fischer & Tangney, 1995). We hypothesized that narcissism should predict the third-
person perspective in the context of self-threatening (i.e., shameful) memories but not in the 
context of negative, yet not self-relevant (i.e., sad) memories. Genuine self-esteem should 
predict the first-person perspective in the context of self-relevant, threatening memories, but 
not necessarily in the context of negative yet not self-relevant ones. We additionally tested 
whether our hypotheses would be supported when considering memories that are not assumed 
to be social.   
Method 
Experiment 2 was conducted among 116 Mturk workers (58 female), aged 18-70 
years (M=30.74, SD=10.16). Sample size was determined with GPower based on the R2 from 
Experiment 1 for the significant interaction assuming power of .80.  
First, we measured self-esteem as in Experiment 1, ZLWK5RVHQEHUJ¶s scale (Į=.88, 
M=3.97, SD=0.64) and narcissism as in Experiment 1, with 40 items of the Narcissistic 
Personality Inventory (Ang & Yusof, 2006; Raskin & Hall, 1979; Į=.93, M=2.96, SD=0.57; 
counterbalanced).  
Then, participants were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions and 
asked to describe memories of situations that happened over the last year. Participants in the 
self-threat condition recalled situations in which they felt ashamed. In the control condition 
they recalled situations in which they felt sad.  
Effectiveness of the manipulation was checked with one item measuring whether 
participants felt sad or ashamed while recalling the situation. (1=sad to 11=ashamed). Three 
participants who failed to describe a memory or respond to the manipulation check were 
excluded (final n=113; 56 in the self-threat condition, 57 in the control condition). Finally, 
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participants completed the same measure of visual perspective as in Experiment 1 (M=2.83, 
SD=2.02).   
Results and discussion 
Self-esteem and narcissism were positively correlated, r(111)=.32, p<.001. Neither 
self-esteem, r(111)=-.05, p=.59, nor narcissism, r(111)=-.001, p=.99, were significantly 
associated with visual perspective. 
We checked the effectiveness of the experimental manipulation. Participants reported 
being less ashamed in the control condition (M=2.58, SD=2.09) than in the self-threat 
condition (M=7.93, SD=2.50), t(111)=12.36, p<.001, d=2.32. 
Like in Experiment 1, we conducted a regression analysis with mean-centered 
continuous variables. Experimental conditions were coded -1=control and 1=self-threat. In 
Step 1, we investigated the main effects of the experimental condition, self-esteem and their 
interaction on visual perspective. In Step 2 we introduced narcissism and the two-way 
interaction of the experimental condition with narcissism (Table 2). 
Table 2 
Experiment 2 Predictors of Third-Person Visual Perspective 
 Step 1 Step 2 
Variables B(SE) BCI95% p B(SE) BCI95% p 
Condition 0.20(0.19) -0.18,0.57 .30 0.19(0.19) -0.19,0.55 .32 
Self-esteem -0.18(0.30) -0.77,0.41 .55 -0.34(0.31) -0.95,0.28 .28 
CoQGLWLRQî6HOI-esteem -0.42(0.30) -1.01,0.17 .16 -0.71(0.31) -1.33,-0.09 .02 
Narcissism    0.21(0.35) -0.49,0.91 .55 
&RQGLWLRQî1DUFLVVLVP    0.92(0.35) 0.23,1.62 .01 
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F 1.14 .34 2.11 .07 
R2 0.03 0.09 
 
Both interaction effects were significant. Narcissism significantly predicted the third-
person perspective in the self-threat condition, but not in the control condition (see Figure 2 
for simple slopes). Furthermore, the self-threat condition significantly negatively predicted 
the third-person perspective for narcissism lower than 1.77. For higher values the relationship 
was not significant, but it became significantly positive for values higher than 3.20. 
 
Self-esteem significantly predicted the first-person perspective in the self-threat 
condition, but not in the control condition (see Figure 3 for simple slopes). Furthermore, the 
self-threat condition significantly positively predicted the third-person perspective for self-
esteem lower than 3.64. For higher values the relationship was not significant. 
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Experiment 2 confirmed that narcissism predicted adopting the third-person perspective in 
the context of self-threatening (shameful) memories but not in the context of negative 
memories which were not threatening to the self (sad). Genuine self-esteem predicted 
recalling self-relevant (even if threatening) memories from the first-person perspective but no 
such effect was found with respect to negative memories irrelevant to the self.  
General Discussion 
Two experiments examined visual perspectives adopted in recalling self-threatening 
memories by individuals with narcissistic versus genuine self-evaluation. In Experiment 1 
narcissism predicted adopting the third-person perspective when recalling self-threatening 
memories of shame but not when recalling self-boosting memories of pride. In Experiment 2 
narcissism predicted adopting the third-person perspective when recalling negative memories 
only if these memories were self-threatening (shameful), but not if they were irrelevant to the 
self (sad). In line with past research (Libby et al., 2011), self-esteem alone was not associated 
with visual perspective. However, after we co-varied out narcissism, genuine self-esteem 
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without the narcissistic component predicted greater likelihood of retrieving self-relevant 
memories from the first-person perspective, regardless of them being positive or negative. 
These results are in line with the assertion that adopting the third-person perspective is 
an attempt to downplay the impact of past emotions and distance oneself from them (Ayduk 
& Kross, 2010; Williams & Moulds, 2007). If the first-person perspective assures emotional 
amplification or directs individuals to re-live past experience, then only people high in 
genuine self-esteem, who are generally less sensitive to psychological threats, should be able 
to face shameful events in this manner. In the case of narcissists, retrieving shameful 
memories via the first-person perspective might be simply too threatening to the self. 
Although Katzir and Eyal (2013) suggest that coping with shame via self-distanced 
perspective may not be generally beneficial, it might be natural for those individuals who are 
not equipped with any other buffer against psychological threats. Still, we cannot conclude 
that narcissistic third-person visualizations leads to effective coping with negative feelings in 
the long-term. Rather, it may be a form of a defensive mnemonic distortion that temporarily 
reduces discrepancies between narcissistV¶ perceived versus ideal self (Robins & John, 1997).  
In conclusion, the present research demonstrates different effects of narcissism and 
genuine self-esteem on adopting visual perspectives when facing autobiographical threats. It 
also highlights the importance of analyzing the underpinnings of natural tendency to recall 
memories via first-person versus third-person visual perspectives. Future studies should 
explore immediate and long-term consequences of both visual perspectives among people 
high in narcissism versus genuine self-esteem. Does recalling self-threatening memories via 
the third-person perspective help narcissists free themselves from a threatening past? Or does 
it backfire by increasing the impact of the threatening event? These questions await further 
empirical investigation. 
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